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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2011 Tunisian revolution has played a role in bringing the corporate governance 
agenda to the forefront. This political change in Tunisia has revealed persistent 
governance problems in its banking industry. This paper presents the results of 
research conducted on how different aspects of corporate governance can influence 
bank performance. The sample comprises 10 Tunisian commercial banks for the 
period from 1997 to 2010. The performance-governance relationship is estimated using 
a range of econometric techniques. The findings reveal strong support for a negative 
association between blockholder ownership and performance. Our results show that the 
bank board size is related to directors' ability to monitor and advise management. 
Additionally, CEO duality is positively associated with performance. Further analysis 
suggests that the presence of government officials on banks' board of directors decreases 
bank performance. Taken together, our findings offer recommendations to regulators, 
especially for the on-going financial reform of corporate boards. 
 
Keywords: endogeneity, commercial banks, corporate governance, agency theory, 
internal control mechanisms, performance, dynamic panel, GMM estimator 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The subprime crisis of 2007–2008 highlighted how little was known about bank 
governance. Since the crisis, the literature on corporate governance has exploded 
and revealed how little sound evidence there is on what constitutes a good 
corporate governance system and what type of management, ownership and 
board structures can lead to strong bank performance (Yin-Hua, Chung, & Liu, 
2011; Peni & Vähämaa, 2012; Sullivan & Spong, 2007; Adams & Mehran, 
2012). Countries have responded to these difficulties by enacting laws and 
regulations aimed at improving governance practices. The implementation of 
these new rules and procedures, however, has not come without costs to firms 
and their shareholders. These responses have thus raised the question of whether 
such changes in governance are reflected in improvements in firm valuation. 
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Previous empirical research has examined factors that influence the structure of 
different governance mechanisms, especially internal governance features, as 
well as the effectiveness of these mechanisms in limiting managers' discretion. 
Indeed, a growing body of recent studies suggests that there is a trend towards an 
increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to the 
discipline from the market for corporate control. This trend reflects an important 
change over the past several decades in the means through which the 
market disciplines corporate behaviour. For more details, see Rose (2009), 
Bauguess, Moeller, Schlingemann and Zutter. (2009), Robinson (2009), Wruck 
and Wu (2009), and Pathan, Skully and Wickrama-nayake (2008). Much of this 
also applies to banks. It is true that banking firms have shown significant 
differences with respect to corporations in other economic sectors, which justifies 
special interest in their governance problems (Prowse, 1997; Adams & Mehran, 
2012). Small deposits are insured and banks are regulated to avoid bank runs; 
however, this practice increases the moral hazard problem, as shown in the 
Savings and Loan crisis in the US. Whether regulation substitutes or 
complements traditional governance mechanisms and controls is a subject of 
debate. However, it is generally agreed that the external controls from 
takeovers and product market competition were weaker in banks than in other 
firms (Prowse, 1997). Good governance relies more on the workings of internal 
mechanisms, such as the supervision and the control exercised by the board of 
directors, along with regulatory constraints. Accordingly, Crespí, Garcia-Cestona 
and Salas (2004) argued that the internal governance mechanism via the board of 
directors works well for banks subject to regulatory constraints. Except in strong 
market-based economies, such as the US and the UK, external governance 
mechanisms such as mergers and takeover markets may not exert effective 
control and monitoring of corporate firms; this is particularly true for banks. 
Therefore, internal governance mechanisms should be closely related to bank 
performance. 
 
Limited to emerging markets, much of the bank corporate governance 
research narrowly focuses on either the broad relationship between ownership 
and financial performance (e.g., Sarkar, Sarkar, & Bhaumik, 1998) or the agency 
aspect of ownership, i.e., the impact of the separation between management and 
ownership on the performance of banks (e.g., Gorton & Schmid, 1999; Hirshey, 
1999). The focus on the relationship between ownership and the financial 
performance of banks in emerging markets stems from concerns about both the 
possibility of inefficient allocation of scarce financial resources in the presence 
of dominant public sector banks and the possible fiscal impact of the banking 
sector's fragility in an environment where directed credit, political patronage and 
severe moral hazard on the part of the public sector's bank officials can lead to 
the significant accumulation of non-performing assets (NPAs)1. 
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In this paper, the view that useful insights are adopted into the extent of 
the resolution of the shareholder-manager conflict are obtained by examining 
multiple control mechanisms. The focus is very much related to the internal 
workings of banks. Therefore, the impact of ownership and board structures on 
the performance of the banking industry in Tunisia has been investigated to 
better understand the structure of Tunisian bank governance and on identifying 
implications for future research. 
 
 
TUNISIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 
 
The corporate governance codes and principles in Tunisia, which was the first 
Mediterranean country to sign an Association Agreement with the European 
Union and to enter a free trade area has been reviewed to provide background for 
the investigation. Tunisia established several reforms of its financial system 
during the 1990s in order to respond to the technological and economic mutations 
the country experienced. Three management systems were invoked: the market-
oriented system (the Anglo-Saxon model), the network-oriented system (the 
German Nippon model) and the intermediary system (the French-Italian model). 
The management system adopted by Tunisia was an intermediary system, which 
is a combination of the Anglo-Saxon model and the French-Italian model. This 
system was introduced in the new Commercial code in November 2000, which 
was promulgated according to the law 2000-93 of 3 November 2000. The 
fundamental principles of this code are protection of shareholders' rights, the 
equitable treatment of shareholders, and the transparency and diffusion of 
information. 
 
Since its implementation, the Commercial code has undergone major 
amendments. It now includes more protections for minority shareholders and 
requires greater disclosure of financial information. Despite these successive 
institutional reforms, corporate governance practices in Tunisia remain less 
than mature. Even though the lack of international exposure has resulted in a 
limited impact of the global financial crisis on the Tunisian corporate sector, it is 
a key factor behind the under-developed corporate governance practices in 
Tunisia. Most companies in Tunisia are involved in significant related-party 
transactions, where disclosure remains limited, internal control procedures 
remain inefficient compared to Western peers, and the concept of board 
independence has yet to be widely accepted. 
 
Notably, after the Revolution of 14 January  2011, good bank governance 
became the focus of attention. One of the weaknesses of the Tunisian banking 
sector is its lack of the application of good governance practices in spite of 
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considerable efforts towards successful modernisation. This is largely attributed 
to the former political regime's intervention. 
 
In this changing context, the Tunisian Central Bank (TCB), guided by its 
own new governance, published a new circular to credit institutions in May 2011. 
This circular defined a set of governance rules. It aimed to establish sound and 
prudent management to ensure the sustainability of the banking system while 
preserving the interests of shareholders, creditors, depositors and employees. In 
the Circular 2011-06, the TCB confirmed the requirement of sound governance. It 
presented essential statutory regulations for the management and supervision 
(governance) of Tunisian banks and contained internationally and nationally 
recognised standards for good and responsible governance. Thus, the separation of 
ownership and executives is recommended, risk management is prioritised, 
prudential management is required, and the relevance of financial reporting is 
advocated as part of this new regulation. 
 
 
THE SAMPLE, VARIABLES, MODELS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The Sample 
 
A dataset of 10 Tunisian commercial banks covering a period of 14 successive 
years ranging from fiscal 1997 through fiscal 2010 are used in this empirical 
work. Thus, this dataset contains 140 observations. The sample has been limited 
to a single industry because the costs and benefits of different governance 
mechanisms may vary systematically across industries. Additionally because 
production technologies in banking firms are fairly homogenous and because 
banks are required to disclose financial information to regulators in a 
uniform way, the banking industry may be particularly suitable for identifying 
the effect of governance on performance2. The data were collected with reference 
to the financial statements published by these banks and stock information 
delivered by the board of the financial market. The choice of this study 
timeframe coincides with the beginning of the electronic quotation system, which 
was put in place in October 1996. 
 
Variables 
 
A detailed discussion of the study variables follows.  
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Performanced measures 
 
Two main measures of the bank profitability have been used: ROA (an 
accounting-based measure) and Tobin's Q (a market-based measure). These 
indicators are calculated as follows: 
 
 
 Netoperatingprofit after taxesROA =
Bookvalueof totalassets
 
 
Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), Tobin's Q was determined by  
 
book value of total assets  book value of common equity + market value of common equityTobin'sQ=
book value of total assets
−  
 
Setting the Tobin's Q measure at this stage ensures that the market is 
recognisable among the mechanisms, with the knowledge that the mechanisms 
might take time to be better reflected in the given value. This partially prevents 
endogeneity problems related to measuring the set of variables in a 
contemporaneous fashion3. 
 
Two other measures of bank performance specific to commercial banks 
(i.e., the interest margin and intermediation margin) are used to test the 
robustness of the analysis. 
 
Interest income Interest expense
InterestMargin =
DEF
it it
it
it
− 	  
	  
 
Interestmargin NetCFI
IntermediationMargin =
DEF
it it
it
it
−  
where 
 
Net CFI = Net commission and fee income, and 
DEF = Deflator, which is equal to the bank's book value of total assets. 
 
The index i denotes the bank under consideration (i = 1,…, 10), whereas 
the index t denotes the year under consideration (t = 1997,…, 2010).  
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Bank governance variables 
 
Banks' board characteristics 
 
Certain characteristics of bank boards (composition, size and CEO/Chair 
duality) reflect the motivations and abilities of a board in its supervisory and 
advisory duties. 
 
The composition of the board of directors is measured by using the 
proportion of outside directors (OUTDIR), which we define as the number of 
non-executive directors of the total number of directors. 
 
In addition, the board size (BSIZE) is measured as the number of 
directors serving on the board. Furthermore, the board leadership structure 
(DUAL) is considered to define a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
when the CEO and the Chairman of the Board are the same person, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Bank ownership structure 
 
The Management Stock Ownership (MSO) is defined as the aggregate 
percentage of shares held by all officers and directors of the bank to be 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Saunders, Strock, & Travlos, 1990; Anderson 
& Fraser, 2000).  
 
This ownership measure is the year-end holdings of officers and 
directors4. The blockholder ownership, BLOCK, is also been introduced, 
measured as the percentage of equity owned by persons and institutions that hold 
5% or more of the company's equity5, including the state, a publicly owned 
institution, a Tunisian or foreign private institutional investor, or any other 
Tunisian or foreign individual investor. 
 
Control variables 
 
Two control variables are included to help explain the factors potentially 
affecting bank performance. The Equity-to-Asset ratio (E/A) is included to 
control for banks' financial leverage. The size variable (lnA) is introduced to 
capture potential scale economies or diseconomies in the banking sector.  
 
Empirical Models 
 
The following regression model has been estimated using the panel data 
technique:  
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8
Y = + MSO + BLOCK + OUTDIR + DUAL + BSIZE + EA +
+ lnA D +t
it it it it it it it
it it
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε+
  
(11) 
 
where: 
 
Yit         :  one of the two performance measures (ROA and Tobin's Q) 
MSO : the percentage of stock owned by officers and directors  
BLOCK :  the fraction of outstanding shares owned by blockholders  
OUTDIR :  the fraction of outside directors 
DUAL :  an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also holds the  
  position of chairman of the board, and zero otherwise 
BSIZE :  The number of directors serving on the board  
(E/A) :  the equity-to-asset ratio 
InA :  the log of the total assets 
Dt :  year dummies 
ɛ :  the error term. 
 
In this model, the index i denotes the bank (i = 1,…, 10), whereas the index (t) 
denotes the year under consideration (t = 1997,…, 2010). 
 
All variables employed in this study are described in Table 1. 
  
 The average (median) managerial ownership amounts to 51% (55.3%), 
with a maximum of 83.9%. The average block ownership amounts to 53.21%, 
which is slightly higher than the average managerial ownership. The results are 
not consistent with the argument that wealth constraints are more binding for 
individuals than for (large) institutional block holders. 
 
The Board Size variable shows that on average, the board of directors is 
composed of 11 members. As Hayes, Mehran and Schaefer (2005) documented, 
financial firms have larger boards than manufacturing firms on average.  
 
The variable OUTDIR indicates that on average, 28% of administrators 
are external. Booth, Cornett and Tehranian (2002) indicated that industrial firms 
contain a significantly smaller percentage of outside (non-executive) directors 
on their boards of directors. 
 
Moreover, for approximately 65% of the boards, the CEO is also the 
chairman. This is a high percentage, although 8 of the 10 banks had separated 
the two functions of CEO/Chair for at least 2 or 3 years of the period under 
study9. Three of them even monitored the board with a directory for a few years 
(BIAT from 2000 to 2006, STB from 2001 to 2004, and BNA from 2001 to 
2004). 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics (1997–2010) 
 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Performance variables 
ROA 0.0089 0.0090 0.0096 –0.0813 0.0318 
ROE 0.0836 0.0978 0.1660 –1.7647 0.2976 
Interest Margin 0.337 0.312 0.166 0.063       1.027 
Intermediation 
Margin 
0.461 0.419 0.229 0.124       1.429 
Tobin's Q 1.0165 1.003 0.0726   0.7186   1.2142 
Governance variables 
BLOCK 0.5321 0.544 0.1581  0.1085 0.8592 
MSO 0.5100 0.5530 0.1710  0.0040 0.8390 
BSIZE 11.1654     12.000 1.5769      6.000 14.000 
OUTDIR 0.2805 0.2727 0.1820 0.000         0.750 
DUAL 0.6546    1.000 0.4771 0.000   1.000 
Bank-specific variables 
lnA      7.7211       7.6788 0.5536 6.6041         8.8178 
Book value of 
total assets 
2620.546 2162.042 1457.674 738.161 6753.589 
EA 0.0991 0.0900 0.0371 0.0340 0.3394 
 
Concerning the performance measures during the 1997–2010 period, 
our sample includes both low- and high-performing banks, as indicated by the 
range of performance measures. By examining the accounting return rate 
(ROA) of the banks, the average value is positive, but low. The traditional 
income indicator for banks (interest margin) is 0.337 on average, which 
indicates that banks receive much more income from the interest-generating 
activities than from other non-financial activities. Descriptive statistics also 
emphasize that the average Tobin's Q is slightly superior to 1 (1.165). 
 
The banks' average size is 2,620.546 million Dinars. Therefore, these 
banks are the smallest among European commercial banks. For example, in 
France, the average total assets of the 15 largest commercial banks calculated 
from 1997 to 2002 amounts to approximately 199.213780 billion Euros7. 
 
Finally, the E/A ratio is low, equalling 9.91% on average. A lower E/A 
ratio signifies a higher degree of leverage. This is explained by the significant 
financing role of the economy played by Tunisian banks. For example, the 
banking shares among the total volume of loans granted by the financial 
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system ranged from 90.8% in 2003 to 93 % in 2004 8. In fact, in order to grant 
loans to the economic agents with financial need, banks facilitated massive 
recourse debt. This confirms banks' vulnerability and, consequently, their 
governance specificity. 
 
The correlations between the variables are shown in Table 2. Table 2 presents the 
Pearson correlation matrix. There are very few significant correlations between 
the variables. Only the BLOCK ratio shows a significant correlation with the 
MSO variable. The VIF test (Variance-Inflation Factor) shows that there is no 
multi-collinearity problem. 
 
Table 2 
Pearson correlation matrix (Panel with 140 observations of 10 Tunisian commercial banks, 
for the 1997–2010 period) 
 
 MSO BLOCK OUTDIR    DUAL BSIZE EA lnA 
MSO 1       
BLOCK 0.707* 
(0.000) 
1      
OUTDIR –0.247* 
(0.000) 
–0.189 
 (0.079) 
1     
DUAL 0.1661 
(0.448) 
–0.023 
(0.823) 
–0.135      
(0.179) 
1    
BSIZE –0.1006  
(0.091) 
–0.124 
(0.219) 
–0.129 
(0.199) 
–0.286* 
(0.004) 
1   
EA –0.2576  
(0.383) 
–0.275* 
(0.006) 
0.137 
(0.174) 
0.223* 
(0.025) 
–0.272* 
(0.006) 
1  
lnA –0.1274  
(0.090) 
–0.443* 
(0.000) 
0.276* 
(0.006) 
0.133 
(0.186) 
–0.124 
(0.218) 
0.246* 
(0.014) 
1 
 
The p-values are reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at 5%. 
 
Econometric Modelling 
 
The unobservable heterogeneity that may be presented in the corporate 
governance and performance relationship must be taken into account to address 
panel data. For our regressions, homogeneity tests confirm the existence of fixed 
individual-specific effects. In this case, the best linear unbiased estimator is the 
within estimator. Nevertheless, in the presence of simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity, this estimator produces biased parameter estimates. Therefore, 
according to Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) and Schultz, Tan and Walsh 
(2010), the Dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) can 
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solve problems raised by simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity and produce 
consistent and unbiased estimates by employing valid internal instruments (Z) 
during the estimation. The validity of the instruments used is checked using the 
Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions; H0: E (Z, ε) = 0. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Regressions of bank performance measures (ROA and Tobin's Q) on ownership structure, 
board characteristics and controls 
 
 ROA Tobin's Q 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Number of 
observations 
      140             140 140      140        140 140 
Constant 0.0422* 
(0.013) 
–0.02760 
(0.489) 
0.0497**  
(0.009) 
2.0450** 
(0.000) 
1.6570** 
(0.000) 
1.0938** 
(0.000) 
MSO 0.0001 
(0.313) 
0.0002*  
(0.044) 
0.0001  
(0.302) 
0.0004 
(0.509) 
0.0002 
(0.604) 
0.0001  
(0.673) 
BLOCK –
0.0142* 
(0.011) 
–0.0182*  
(0.033) 
–0.0147*  
(0.013) 
–0.1475** 
(0.000) 
–0.0172 
(0.593) 
–0.0703* 
(0.011) 
OUTDIR –0.0015 
(0.713) 
–0.0032  
(0.501) 
–0.0005  
(0.892) 
–0.0696** 
(0.003) 
–0.0323 
(0.101) 
–0.0218 
(0.315) 
DUAL 0.0031 
(0.095) 
0.0044  
(0.042)* 
0.0024  
(0.209) 
–0.0082 
(0.394) 
–0.0113 
(0.192) 
–0.0050 
(0.551) 
BSIZE –0.0003 
(0.565) 
–0.0006  
(0.411) 
–0.0005 
 (0.369) 
–0.0129** 
(0.000) 
–0.0104** 
(0.001) 
–0.0086** 
(0.002) 
EA   0.0623** 
(0.007) 
0.0409  
(0.078) 
0.0371  
(0.102) 
–0.4470** 
(0.000) 
–0.6342** 
(0.000) 
–0.3111* 
(0.016) 
lnA –0.0041     
(0.042)* 
0.0064 
(0.259) 
–0.0037 
 (0.062) 
–0.1053** 
(0.000) 
–0.0472** 
(0.006) 
–0.0526** 
(0.000) 
ROAt–1     0.2016*  
  (0.021) 
   
Tobin's Qt–1      0.5482** 
(0.000) 
R2 0.3345 0.1624  0.6729 0.5147  
Hausman Test 
Statistics 
 23.36* 
(0.0015) 
  22.03** 
(0.0025) 
 
Wald chi2 
statistics 
Prob > chi2 
  
44.85**  
(0.001) *** 
  114.27** (0.000) 
                                                                                       (continued on next page) 
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Table 3  (continued) 
	  
 ROA Tobin's Q 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
AR(1) test                 
(p-value) 
  0.000   0.000 
AR(2) test                
(p-value) 
  0.984   0.111 
Hansen test            
of over- 
identification 
(p-value) 
  0.63   0.10 
 
The p-values are reported in parentheses; * Statistically significant at 5%; ** Statistically significant at 1%. 
Note: The GMM model includes one lag of the dependent variable. Year dummies, included in all specifications, 
are unreported. ROA: return on assets, Tobin's Q: market value of equity preferred Stock and Liabilities to total 
assets, MSO: the percentage of stock owned by officers and directors, BLOCK: the fraction of outstanding shares 
owned by blockholders, OUTDIR: the fraction of outside directors, DUAL: an indicator variable equal to one if 
the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board and zero otherwise, BSIZE: The number of directors 
serving on the board, EA : The equity to asset ratio, lnA : The natural log of the book value of total assets. 
 
To verify the need to apply the dynamic GMM estimations, the Hausman 
specification test for endogeneity (H0: Regressors are exogenous) is applied to the 
corporate governance variables. The results reveal that endogeneity is a major 
concern, confirming the fact that the fixed effects coefficient estimates are 
unreliable and biased. 
 
 Therefore, all the models will be estimated using the pooled OLS 
method, in spite of the method's strict exogeneity assumptions, given its 
extensive employ in the corporate governance literature. Thus, a within 
estimator for static fixed effects is employed. Furthermore, the dynamic models 
are considered using the Blundel and Bond (1998) GMM estimation. This 
estimation is based on equations in levels and in first differences,  to estimate the 
governance/performance relation by taking into account both dynamic aspects 
and time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, the relation between governance structures and bank performance 
are estimated. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), the OLS, fixed effects and 
dynamic fixed effects (system GMM) models are estimated in order to compare 
them to past research and to understand biases that arise from ignoring different 
aspects of endogeneity. 
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Table 3 reports the results when ROA (an accounting-based measure) 
and Tobin's Q (a market-based measure) are used as performance measures. We 
include one lag of performance in the dynamic model. This makes historical 
performance and historical corporate governance variables for one period or 
more available for use as instruments.  
 
 The results of the static OLS estimations are reported in columns 2 and 5 
of Table 3 and suggest a significant relation between governance mechanisms 
and bank performance. Particularly, the results suggest a significant negative 
relationship between the Blockholder ownership and the two performance 
measures at the 5% level of significance. The coefficients do not confirm the 
effect expected by the agency theory, i.e., the effect of dominant shareholders 
on banking performance. Instead of a positive effect, the estimated coefficients 
present a negative association. This opens up the possibility for an explanation in 
terms of a private appropriation of benefits. Indeed, given that some 
shareholders represent some of the internal directors of Tunisian banks (directly 
or via representatives), the true problem is that these banks do not necessarily 
experience a conflict between shareholders and managers, but rather a conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
 
The static OLS estimates using only Tobin's Q suggest a negative and 
significant relation between board independence, board size and bank 
performance. Thus, increasingly larger and independent boards destroy value.  
 
The static fixed effects model is then estimated to correct for 
unobservable heterogeneity that may be present in the bank governance and 
performance relation. The results are presented in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3. 
The coefficient on MSO is positive and significant when using only ROA as a 
dependent variable, providing evidence that bank performance increases when 
managerial stock ownership is significant. Our result supports Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), who argued that managerial share ownership can reduce 
managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders' wealth 
and engage in other non-maximising behaviour and thereby help in aligning 
the interests between management and shareholders. This is the "convergence-
of-interest" hypothesis. Overall, the results corroborate Mehran (1995), who 
found a positive relation between the capital share of the CEO and bank 
performance (measured by ROA).  
 
In fixed effects estimates using only ROA as a dependent variable, the 
association between the function of the president of the board and the role of 
the manager positively influences bank performance. This result indicates that 
a dual leadership structure allows a good knowledge of bank activities and 
internal and external environments. Additionally, it reinforces managers' 
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engagement in improving bank performance. Moreover, managers become 
motivated to develop a good reputation in the market (Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993; Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997). Nevertheless, this result contradicts the 
literature, which denounces this form of leadership due to its power abuse. Some 
authors such as Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) stipulate that dual 
leadership accentuates agency costs and weakens board effectiveness, thus 
reducing performance. More recently, Godard and Schatt (2004) find that 
French companies that have chosen a dual leadership structure are more 
profitable in the long run, confirming the paramount role played by the duality to 
create value.  
 
However, the fixed effects estimation only accounts for unobservable 
heterogeneity. Therefore, its estimates may be biased in the presence of dynamic 
endogeneity and simultaneity. Given the presence of endogeneity in the corporate 
governance and bank performance relation, as proven by Hausman endogeneity 
tests for the corporate governance variables, we apply the dynamic system in 
addition to the OLS and fixed effects estimations. 
 
The dynamic system GMM estimation are presented in columns 4 and 7 
of Table 3. When it moves to a dynamic GMM model that includes lagged 
performance, the negative relation between blockholder ownership and bank 
performance remains true. It is important to note that these large capital stakes 
protect their holders from hostile takeovers and thus become entrenched. Then, 
they will be encouraged to extract private benefits of control at the expense of 
minority shareholders, thus imposing high agency costs on the latter 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk, Kraakam, & Triantis, 2000). 
Additionally, bank loans' opacity facilitates wealth expropriation compared to 
that of other companies. This result is consistent w i th  Haw, Ho, Hu, and Wu 
(2007), Strahan (2004) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), who did not allot the 
first role of active control to large blockholders. This result means that smaller 
block ownership leads to a better accounting performance, not the opposite, i.e., 
weak performance leads large shareholders to reduce their participation in the 
bank. Additionally, the coefficient on BSIZE remains negative and statically 
significant at the 5% level. In fact, as size increases, the board becomes less 
effective in monitoring managers because of free rider problems and the 
increased time spent on decision-making (Jensen, 1993). These results are similar 
to those obtained by Wintoki et al. (2012) using static OLS and fixed effects 
estimates, and they are also consistent with the empirical evidence in the 
corporate governance literature: Large boards encounter problems of 
coordination, control, and decision-making. The significant and negative 
coefficient on BSIZE imposes an efficient limit to the appointment of too many 
directors. 
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Lastly, the coefficient on EA is negative in dynamic estimates using only 
Tobin's Q as a dependent variable; performance increases when banking 
leverage is significant. This is explained by the governance role played by 
depositors who can force managers to not use banks' funds on non-profitable 
investments (Jensen, 1993). Finally, there is evidence that as the size of the bank 
increases, its profitability decreases, as evidenced by the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the lnA variable shown in most 
specifications. 
 
In Table 3, the results of the specification tests are reported: The 
Arellano-Bond second- order serial correlation tests and the Hansen-Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen-Sargan test indicates that hypothesis 
cannot be rejected to which our instruments are valid. Moreover, the Arellano-
Bond test statistics indicate that there exists no autocorrelations among the errors 
for all specifications. Hence, the GMM-specifications are well specified based 
on the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond 
test of autocorrelation. These results are consistent for all bank performance 
measures. 
 
 
TESTING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS 
 
Additional Performance Variables 
 
Following previous governance papers (e.g., Adams & Mehran, 2012), the 
relation between other accounting measures of performance specific to 
commercial banks (i.e., interest margin and intermediation margin) and 
ownership structure, board size and composition has been investigated as a 
robustness check of the previous results. This allows to determine the 
sensitivity of the results to different specifications of the dependent variable. As 
stated by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), stock market returns adjust interest 
divergences between managers and owners, while accounting measures do 
not. Smith (1996) and Weisbach (1988) make similar claims, stating a 
preference for using accounting profits to identify the effects of active 
governance. Moreover, stock market valuations reflect the market's present 
valuation of long-run returns, while accounting returns reflect the immediate 
effect of shareholder oversight (Kim, Lee & Rhee et al., 2007). 
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Table 4  
Regressions of bank performance measures (interest margin and intermediation margin) 
on ownership structure, board characteristics and controls 
 
 Interest margin Intermediation margin 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed effects    System 
GMM 
   Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Number of   
observations 
           140          140       140          140      140     140 
Constant 0.1112**  
(0.000) 
0.1354**  
(0.000) 
0.0622** 
(0.000) 
0.1624**  
(0.000) 
0.1674**  
(0.000) 
0.0952**  
(0.000) 
MSO 0.00005  
(0.582) 
4.56e-06  
(0.958) 
0.00002  
(0.741) 
0.00006  
(0.405) 
0.00004  
(0.357) 
0.00003  
(0.405) 
BLOCK –0.024**  
(0.000) 
–0.0191** 
(0.001) 
–0.012**  
(0.002) 
–0.0272**  
(0.000) 
–0.0120** 
(0.004) 
–0.0104**  
(0.000) 
 OUTDIR 0.0066*  
(0.051) 
0.0084*  
(0.019) 
0.0015  
(0.565) 
–0.0036  
(0.223) 
0.0002  
(0.916) 
–0.0015  
(0.389) 
 DUAL 0.0049**  
(0.002) 
0.0025  
(0.105) 
0.0018  
(0.140) 
0.0024*  
(0.053) 
0.0028** 
(0.007) 
0.0014  
(0.092) 
BSIZE –0.0003  
(0.501) 
–0.0005  
(0.321) 
–0.0001  
(0.612) 
0.00004  
(0.919) 
–0.0004  
(0.210) 
–0.00007  
(0.795) 
EA –0.0068 
 (0.724) 
–0.0033  
(0.852) 
–0.0149  
(0.298) 
0.0146  
(0.347) 
0.0147  
(0.195) 
–0.0021  
(0.830) 
 lnA –0.009**  
(0.000) 
–0.0115*  
(0.000) 
–0.005**  
(0.000) 
–0.014**  
(0.000) 
–0.0155  
(0.000) 
–0.007**  
(0.000) 
Interest  
margin t–1 
  0.5637**  
(0.000) 
   
Intermediation 
margin t–1 
     0.4643**  
(0.000) 
R2 0.3631 0.4173  0.6016 0.5180  
Hausman Test 
statistics 
 147.51** 
(0.0000) 
  103.74** 
(0.0000) 
 
Wald chi2 
statistics 
 Prob > chi2 
  43.58**  
 
(0.001) 
  104.23**  
 
(0.0000) 
AR(1)  
test (p-value) 
  0.000   0.000 
AR(2) test  
(p-value) 
  0.063   0.731 
Hansen test of 
over- 
identification                      
(p-value)  
  0.61  0.96  
 
The p-values are reported in parentheses; *Statistically significant at 5 %; **Statistically significant at 1%.  
Note: The GMM models include one lag of the dependent variable. Year dummies, included in all 
specifications, are unreported. 
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 In this case, the results partially reinforce conclusions for the ROA and 
Tobin's Q. Mainly, the results for the blockholder ownership variable 
corroborate the previous results. The coefficient on the board independence 
variable becomes positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
static OLS and fixed effects models (except for the Intermediation Margin 
model). As already mentioned in the literature review, outside (non-executive) 
directors have a more objective view of the firm and are usually better capable of 
fulfilling the supervisory function. This result supports the argument that adding 
outside directors to the board improves management supervision and reduces the 
conflict of interest among stakeholders, as predicted by theory. Moreover, if a 
bank appoints a new outside director with advisory capabilities, strategic 
decisions should improve performance because the counselling skills of the 
directors complement those of the CEO. The enhanced bank performance should 
be expected. This finding is similar to those obtained by a number of prior 
studies, including Byrd and Hickman (1992), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and 
Staikouras, Staikouras and Agoraki (2007), who observed that increased 
representation by outside (non-executive) directors on the Board of Directors is 
positively associated with firm performance and shareholder wealth. Moreover, 
the coefficient on the DUAL variable remains positive and significant at 5% in 
most static OLS and fixed effects estimations. 
 
Blockholder ownership remains significantly and negatively related to 
bank performance in a dynamic model. Moreover, the results show that when 
we include fixed effects in a dynamic model and conduct GMM estimations, the 
coefficient on board independence is insignificant. This is in sharp contrast to 
the results from the static fixed effects model, for which the coefficient on board 
independence is significantly positive. However, the positive bias in the fixed 
effects coefficient estimate is consistent with the bias expected if the dynamic 
relation between current corporate governance and past performance is 
ignored: if board independence is positively related to past performance, then 
fixed effects estimates of the relation between board independence and firm 
performance will be positively biased. Moreover, the positive and significant 
coefficient on the DUAL variable disappears. 
 
The coefficient on lnA is negative and significant at the 1% level in all 
models, corroborating the results of Spong, DeYoung and Sullivan (1996) and 
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). 
 
The Presence of Government Officials on Banks' Boards of Directors 
 
Given the central place of state ownership in the Tunisian banks' capital, we are 
motivated to control for government ownership, which is argued to affect 
principal-agent relationships (Levine, 2003) and to be associated with poorly 
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developed banks (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2001). 
 
At this level, it is important to note that the Tunisian bank corporate 
governance system is characterised by government intervention, strong 
regulation and limited market discipline. Indeed, state intervention in the 
Tunisian banking system is marked mainly by the strong prudential banking 
regulations described above, strict supervision provided by the monetary 
authorities (the Central bank of Tunisia and the Ministry of Finance), through 
reforms completed or initiated and restructuring and modernisation programs, 
and by holding significant capital shares in the banks directly or through 
institutions it controls (see the IMF Report No. 04/359). 
 
Importantly, note that the presence of retired high-ranking officials of 
the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Tunisia on banks' boards of 
directors is also linked to the state ownership of banks' capital. Direct Tunisian 
state ownership is currently 9.85% of banks' shares on average, while the 
indirect control of the public establishment was 16.11% on average. The 
Tunisian National Social Security Fund (CNSS) and the Tunisian National 
Oil company (ETAP) are the main public enterprises that are shareholders of the 
Tunisian banking system. Thus, any eventual inefficiency of banks' governance 
is largely due to the absence of external pressures on managers, especially when 
the state is both a shareholder and supervisor. In this way, internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, notably, the board of directors, are of central 
importance to Tunisian banks. Hence, we choose to test the effect of the 
presence of retired high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank of Tunisia on banks' performance. 
 
The impact of the presence of government officials on the board of 
directors is proxied by including the following variable: 
 
State directors: A dummy variable that takes the value one if a 
government official(s) from the Ministry of Finance and/or the Central Bank of 
Tunisia belongs to a bank's boards of directors, and zero otherwise. 
 
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the inclusion of the state director 
variable changes the results slightly. Most regressions report consistent roles of 
ownership and board variables in explaining bank performance. In all 
regressions, evidence is found of the importance of blockholder ownership, 
duality and board size for bank performance. 
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Table 5  
Regressions of bank performance measures (ROA and Tobin's Q) on ownership structure, 
board characteristics, the presence of government officials on banks' board of directors 
and controls 
 
 ROA Tobin's Q 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Number of 
observations 
140 140 140 140 140 140 
Constant –0.0113 
(0.779) 
 –0.0113  
(0.779) 
0.0250 
(0.292) 
1.7935**  
(0.000) 
1.2448** 
(0.000) 
1.0576** 
(0.000) 
MSO 0.0001 
(0.325) 
0.0002*  
(0.018) 
0.0001 
(0.280) 
0.0003  
(0.530) 
0.0003  
(0.495) 
0.0001  
(0.719) 
BLOCK –0.0131* 
(0.019) 
–0.0144* 
(0.051) 
–0.0125* 
(0.035) 
–0.1335**  
(0.000) 
0.0094  
(0.780) 
–0.0645* 
(0.013) 
OUTDIR –0.0017 
(0.677) 
–0.0009  
(0.847) 
–0.00007 
(0.985) 
–0.0721**  
(0.001) 
–0.0243 
 (0.213) 
–0.0312  
(0.125) 
DUAL 0.0045* 
(0.023) 
0.0022  
(0.360) 
0.0045* 
(0.030) 
0.0097 
 (0.308) 
–0.0213* 
(0.027) 
0.0070  
(0.414)  
BSIZE 0.0004 
(0.397) 
–0.0008 
 (0.283) 
–0.0007* 
(0.0186) 
–0.0149**  
(0.000) 
–0.0095** 
(0.002) 
–0.0120** 
(0.000) 
State directors 0.0041  
(0.057) 
0.0079* 
(0.047) 
–0.0038 
(0.094) 
–0.0519**  
(0.000) 
0.0265  
(0.118) 
–0.0372** 
(0.000) 
 EA 0.0562* 
(0.014) 
0.0350  
(0.130) 
0.0315 
(0.152) 
–0.5246*  
(0.000) 
–0.7052** 
(0.000) 
–0.3160* 
(0.012) 
 lnA –0.0011 
(0.669) 
0.0039  
(0.495) 
–0.0006 
(0.813) 
–0.0654  
(0.000) 
–0.0075 
 (0.739) 
–0.0299** 
(0.009) 
 ROA t–1   0.1753* 
(0.043) 
   
 Tobin's Q t–1       0.4415** 
(0.000) 
 R2 0.3548    0.0637  0.6822 0.1434  
Hausman Test   
Statistics 
 71.88* 
(0.0315) 
  87.78** 
(0.0000) 
 
Wald chi2   
statistics 
Prob > chi2 
    50.42**  
    (0.000) 
  143.74 **    
   (0.000) 
AR(1) test                  
(p-value) 
      0.000       0.000 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5: (continued) 
	  
 ROA Tobin's Q 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed effects System 
GMM 
AR(2) test                  
(p-value) 
   0.781    0.105 
Hansen test    
of over- 
Identification                  
(p-value) 
   
  0.62 
   0.13 
 
 The p-values are reported in parentheses; * Statistically significant at 5 %; ** Statistically significant at 1%.  
  
 Importantly, the static OLS estimate suggests a negative and significant 
relation between the board participation of government officers and bank 
performance (except for ROA and the interest margin). Interestingly, when we 
estimate this relation in static fixed effects models, the sign flips to positive and 
significant. This implies that an OLS regression that ignores the unobservable 
heterogeneity of managerial behaviour may find a negative relation between 
performance and the presence of government officials on banks' boards of 
directors. 
 
 However, in the dynamic GMM model, the relation between the 
presence of government officials on banks' boards of directors and performance 
is significant and negative when using Tobin's Q as a dependent variable. The 
intuition behind the sign reversal with respect to the effect of the board 
participation of government officers on performance is an interesting one and 
illustrates the bias that may arise from ignoring both unobservable heterogeneity 
and the dynamic relation between corporate governance and past performance. 
This result is similar to those reported in a number of prior studies including 
Bolbol, Fatheldin and Omran (2004), who use data on financial institutions 
and industrial firms in Tunisia and three other Arab countries. This result may 
be explained by the observation that the most effective managers are less 
monitored by the government and therefore have fewer state directors. Of 
course, these banks will exhibit enhanced performance. These are expected 
results for an emerging economy such as Tunisia's, for which the performance 
may be influenced by alternative governance mechanisms and the presence of 
state directors rather than external governance mechanisms considered deficient, 
i.e., the weakness of investor protection and the absence of well-developed 
markets for corporate control. 
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Table 6 
Regression of bank performance measures (Interest margin and Intermediation margin) on 
ownership structure, board characteristics, the presence of government officials on banks' 
board of directors and controls 
 
 Interest Margin Intermediation Margin 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Number of 
observations 
           140           140            140          140       140        140 
Constant 0.1059** 
(0.000) 
0.1873** 
(0.000) 
0.0664** 
(0.000) 
0.1410** 
(0.000) 
0.1918** 
(0.000) 
0.0947** 
(0.000) 
MSO 0.00005 
(0.590) 
0.00004 
(0.614) 
0.00002 
(0.733) 
0.00006 
(0.422) 
0.00008 
(0.117) 
0.00003 
(0.407) 
BLOCK –0.024** 
(0.000) 
–0.0131* 
(0.020) 
–0.012** 
(0.002) 
–0.026** 
(0.000) 
–0.0101** 
(0.010) 
–0.010** 
(0.001) 
OUTDIR 0.0065 
(0.081) 
0.0112** 
(0.001) 
0.0014  
(0.592) 
–0.0038 
(0.184) 
0.0016 
(0.474) 
–0.0016 
(0.387) 
DUAL 0.0053** 
(0.002) 
–0.0005 
(0.750) 
0.0015  
(0.272) 
0.0040** 
(0.003) 
0.0011 
(0.287) 
0.0015 
(0.128) 
BSIZE –0.0003 
(0.455) 
–0.0005 
(0.272) 
–0.0001 
(0.630) 
–0.0001 
(0.743) 
–0.0006 
(0.086) 
–0.00007 
(0.791) 
State directors –0.0011 
(0.555) 
0.0089** 
(0.001) 
0.0007  
(0.673) 
–0.004** 
(0.003) 
0.0058** 
(0.002) 
–0.0001 
(0.913) 
EA –0.0058 
(0.772) 
–0.0059 
(0.724) 
–0.0143 
(0.328) 
0.0080 
(0.595) 
0.01052 
(0.325) 
–0.0021 
(0.827) 
lnA –0.008** 
(0.000) 
–0.0183** 
(0.000) 
–0.005** 
(0.003) 
–0.011** 
(0.000) 
–0.0169** 
(0.000) 
–0.007** 
(0.000) 
Interest Margin t–1   0.5674** 
(0.000) 
   
Intermediation 
Margint–1 
     0.4622** 
(0.000) 
R2 0.4564 0.2744  0.6309 0.3813  
Hausman Test 
Statistics 
 
 60.50** 
(0.0000) 
  70.35* 
(0.0311) 
 
Wald chi2 statistics 
Prob > chi2 
  43.66* 
(0.002) 
  104.24** 
(0.000) 
AR (1) test (p-
value) 
  0.000   0.000 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 6  (continued)	  
	  
 Interest margin Intermediation margin 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
AR (2) test (p-value)     0.068    0.736 
hansen test of over- 
identification                     
(p-value) 
      0.58    0.75 
 
The p-values are reported in parentheses; * Statistically significant at 5 %; ** Statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate governance is a young academic field characterised by partial 
theories, limited access to high-quality data, inconsistent empirics, and 
unresolved methodological problems. This paper has attempted to improve 
empirical insight into the relationship between internal corporate governance, 
particularly ownership and board characteristics, and performance by 
analysing this relationship in a different way a n d  in an improved empirical 
setting using various econometric techniques. Specifically, taking endogeneity 
sources into account, the GMM technique is applied to estimate the effect of 
governance on performance for a panel of 10 Tunisian banks from 1997 to 
2010. A negative and significant impact of blockholder ownership on bank 
performance is observed. This finding indicates that for banks with controlling 
owners, the entrenchment effect acts as the predominant force shaping bank 
operations. According to Haw et al. (2007), this detrimental effect is 
concentrated in countries with poor legal protection, heavy government 
intervention and weak private monitoring. Additionally, board size and 
performance are negatively related, which confirms the widespread belief 
that small boards are more efficient. CEO duality seems to be effective at 
mitigating agency conflicts in Tunisian banking firms. 
 
Many of these results hold after the controls for the measure of 
performance and the presence of government officials on banks' boards of 
directors. Mainly, t h e  empirical evidence is obtained that the advisability of 
state directors does not perform monitoring and advising functions in an 
efficient manner. These directors should be a minority on the board. The 
number of state directors at the expense of other ones is decreased accordingly. 
Additionally, banks, as complex units, benefit from smaller boards. Moreover, 
it is preferable to cumulate the function of the manager and that of the president 
of the board. Finally, the presence of the largest shareholders should be avoided 
to ensure more stability. 
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Given the stable corporate governance structure in Tunisia, the results 
are to be expected, i.e., the governance characteristics are crucial for Tunisian 
bank performance. 
 
Although more research needs to be conducted on the role of the sound 
governance of banks, the analysis suggests that banking is unique in its 
performance-governance relation. This should be taken into consideration by 
Tunisian shareholders and boards of directors when making important strategic 
decisions. 
 
These insights have far-reaching policy implications, as they indicate 
that the regulations and guiding principles for good corporate governance 
should be reviewed. 
 
Importantly, the events of the Arab uprisings have planted the 
governance debate firmly within the public discourse in the region. In Tunisia, 
the confiscation of private ownership stakes has required a reflection on how 
enterprises should be governed. Accordingly, just a few months after the 
revolution, the transitional government introduced new guidelines for the 
corporate governance of banks. The Arab uprisings may have been detrimental 
to the performance of capital markets in the region in the short term. However, 
perhaps we should remember that there is nothing more effective than a crisis 
in drawing out an opportunity. This opportunity is to leverage the corporate 
governance debate to raise international interest in the Arab markets and to 
attract more stable investment in the region. Liquidity and listings, the two 
preoccupations of stock exchanges and securities regulators in the region, will 
follow. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. See Bhaumik and Piesse (2008) for more details. 
2. It is possible to view the regulatory oversight of the banking industry as a substitute 
for corporate governance. However, there are few specific regulations concerning 
banking firm boards and governance. In addition, the presence of a regulator should 
affect all banking firms with the same regulator, as in the case of our sample. 
3. Dybvig and Warachka (2010) stated recent endogeneity concerns when Tobin's Q is 
used as a measure of firm performance. 
4. Note that managers hold smaller capital stakes in their banks. For examples, 
according to the leaflets on the capital increase, for the BIAT, 3 of the 4 members 
of the directory held 0.17% of the capital on 30 June 2004; for the UIB, the CEO 
and the Chairman of the Board held 20 shares on 26 August 2004. 
5. According to the law No 2006-19 of 10 May 2006, a blockholder is defined as 
a shareholder who holds more than 5%  of a firm's outstanding shares. 
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6. The Arab Tunisian Bank adopted this separation during the 14 years of the study 
(from 1997 to 2010). 
7. Standard and Poor's Ratings Services (2002). Comparative statistics: French bank. 
The McGraw-Hill Companies, October. 
8. Annual report of the Tunisian Central Bank in 2004. 
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